Madhyamika and Yogacara (Gadjin M. Nagao)
Philological and Philosophical Prattle
[My 1-star Amazon review (NDA) of “Madhyamika and Yogacara: A Study of Mahayana Philosophies” by Gadjin M. Nagao.]
If there is a single late-20th-century to present-time Buddhist academic with a clue about Buddhism as a whole, I haven’t encountered him or her. And this study by G.M Nagao is just another example of the ignorance disseminated by these professors. In this book’s preface, Dr. Nagao informs us of the nature of his study:
“My study has been philological rather than philosophical. By the term philological, I do not mean to imply a purely linguistic investigation, but rather, I refer to the process of interpreting a text as faithful as possible. This means that I have interpreted the purport of those treatises through the acarya's own words, and thus, I avoided the danger of being too speculative.”
Because this book’s emphasis is philological, with pointy-headed consideration of one (mainly obscure) Buddhist term after another, it is a text more suited for Buddhist academics than general readers. And those in the Buddhist “know,” will find themselves often cringing at Nagao’s interpretations of terms and textual analysis.
But does Nagao adhere to his own claim of avoiding the “danger of being too speculative”? Hardly. And his venture into speculative philosophy is even less impressive than his philological considerations. In his vivid imagination, Yogacara represents the culmination of Nagarjuna’s “great genius.” According to Nagao, “The Madhyamika thoughts represent, as it were, the ascending of wisdom, and the Yogacara ideas represent the descending of compassion.”
Anyone ignorant enough to buy Nagao’s central theme, that “the Madhyamikas and the Yogacara’s then can be assumed to be the movement of ascent and descent respectively,” might find this book a worthwhile read. And if you think Nagarjuna was a “great genius” -- I happen to think he was an idiot who perverted Buddhism – then this book could be right up your alley.
Buddhists who appreciate contradiction-riddled metaphysics that spits in the face of Aristotelean logic will doubtless resonate with the ontological nonsense proffered by Professor Nagao. For example, he writes:
“In this case, the subject of ‘is not’ (negation) and the subject of ‘is’ (affirmation) are different from each other, the former being defilement and the latter virtue. In the Madhyanta, however, one and the same entity (abhutaparikalpa) is the subject of both "is not" and "is," of both nonexistence and existence. The duality of subject and object, which is essential to abhutaparikalpa, is negated; hence, sunyata is. And that very emptiness of what is empty is never negated, is never nonexistent. It is in this sphere
of sunyata that abhutaparikalpa takes its shape anew; hence, "existence of nonexistence." In such a case, one and the same thing possesses a kind of "double structure" of being and non-being. This double structure will be seen both in abhutaparikalpa and in sunyata; in its aspect of 'non-being,' the abhutaparikalpa necessarily turns out to be sunyata, while in that of 'being,' sunyata itself naturally becomes abhutaparikalpa.”
Elsewhere Dr. Nagao writes, “This sunyata is not a mere negation; it transcends both existence and non-existence.”
Unbeknownst to Dr. Nagao, emptiness is a non-existent with no ontological status, and there is us no such thing as the existence of non-existence, because if non-existence existed it would no longer be non-existent. But if philosophical prattle that specializes in the reification of zero and the apotheosis of an ineffable emptiness beyond both existence and non-existence floats your boat, then by all means get this book.
Dr.Nagao informs us that “the tri-kaya theory of the Buddha [was] brought to perfection by the Yogacara-vijnana school.” But Dr. Nagao doesn’t deeply grasp this theory and how it ontologically differentiates Yogacara from Madhyamika. Further, he doesn’t understand that the Buddhist trikaya Svavbhavikakaya/Dharmakaya, Sambhogikakaya, Nirmanakaya) fundamentally mirrors the Christian trinity. He, ignorantly, avers, “Therefore one may say that the tri-kaya doctrine is fairly different than the trinity of Christianity.”
Dr. Nagao contends that “both Yogacara and Madhyamika are established on the foundation of sunyata,” that the Madhyamika that was started by Nagarjuna became fully accomplished by Yogacara-Vijnanavada.” I contend the opposite of Dr. Nagao. The Svabbhavikakaya (or Essence Body) of the Yogacara trikaya specifically refers to ones own being (svabhava), and Nagarjuna patently rejects the idea of svabhava. To my mind, Yogacara represents the attempt of Mahayana Buddhism to break free of Nagarjuna’s nonsense, and to reestablish Buddhism on the rightful foundation of Consciousness, or Mind, rather than on that of sunyata (or emptiness).
[My 1-star Amazon review (NDA) of “Madhyamika and Yogacara: A Study of Mahayana Philosophies” by Gadjin M. Nagao.]
If there is a single late-20th-century to present-time Buddhist academic with a clue about Buddhism as a whole, I haven’t encountered him or her. And this study by G.M Nagao is just another example of the ignorance disseminated by these professors. In this book’s preface, Dr. Nagao informs us of the nature of his study:
“My study has been philological rather than philosophical. By the term philological, I do not mean to imply a purely linguistic investigation, but rather, I refer to the process of interpreting a text as faithful as possible. This means that I have interpreted the purport of those treatises through the acarya's own words, and thus, I avoided the danger of being too speculative.”
Because this book’s emphasis is philological, with pointy-headed consideration of one (mainly obscure) Buddhist term after another, it is a text more suited for Buddhist academics than general readers. And those in the Buddhist “know,” will find themselves often cringing at Nagao’s interpretations of terms and textual analysis.
But does Nagao adhere to his own claim of avoiding the “danger of being too speculative”? Hardly. And his venture into speculative philosophy is even less impressive than his philological considerations. In his vivid imagination, Yogacara represents the culmination of Nagarjuna’s “great genius.” According to Nagao, “The Madhyamika thoughts represent, as it were, the ascending of wisdom, and the Yogacara ideas represent the descending of compassion.”
Anyone ignorant enough to buy Nagao’s central theme, that “the Madhyamikas and the Yogacara’s then can be assumed to be the movement of ascent and descent respectively,” might find this book a worthwhile read. And if you think Nagarjuna was a “great genius” -- I happen to think he was an idiot who perverted Buddhism – then this book could be right up your alley.
Buddhists who appreciate contradiction-riddled metaphysics that spits in the face of Aristotelean logic will doubtless resonate with the ontological nonsense proffered by Professor Nagao. For example, he writes:
“In this case, the subject of ‘is not’ (negation) and the subject of ‘is’ (affirmation) are different from each other, the former being defilement and the latter virtue. In the Madhyanta, however, one and the same entity (abhutaparikalpa) is the subject of both "is not" and "is," of both nonexistence and existence. The duality of subject and object, which is essential to abhutaparikalpa, is negated; hence, sunyata is. And that very emptiness of what is empty is never negated, is never nonexistent. It is in this sphere
of sunyata that abhutaparikalpa takes its shape anew; hence, "existence of nonexistence." In such a case, one and the same thing possesses a kind of "double structure" of being and non-being. This double structure will be seen both in abhutaparikalpa and in sunyata; in its aspect of 'non-being,' the abhutaparikalpa necessarily turns out to be sunyata, while in that of 'being,' sunyata itself naturally becomes abhutaparikalpa.”
Elsewhere Dr. Nagao writes, “This sunyata is not a mere negation; it transcends both existence and non-existence.”
Unbeknownst to Dr. Nagao, emptiness is a non-existent with no ontological status, and there is us no such thing as the existence of non-existence, because if non-existence existed it would no longer be non-existent. But if philosophical prattle that specializes in the reification of zero and the apotheosis of an ineffable emptiness beyond both existence and non-existence floats your boat, then by all means get this book.
Dr.Nagao informs us that “the tri-kaya theory of the Buddha [was] brought to perfection by the Yogacara-vijnana school.” But Dr. Nagao doesn’t deeply grasp this theory and how it ontologically differentiates Yogacara from Madhyamika. Further, he doesn’t understand that the Buddhist trikaya Svavbhavikakaya/Dharmakaya, Sambhogikakaya, Nirmanakaya) fundamentally mirrors the Christian trinity. He, ignorantly, avers, “Therefore one may say that the tri-kaya doctrine is fairly different than the trinity of Christianity.”
