Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path (Rudolf Steiner)
An Overrated Epistemology Text
[My 3-star Amazon review (August 27, 2013) of “Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path: A Philosophy of Fredom” by Rudolf Steiner.]
“Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path” is a mixed bag. It has positive aspects—its stress on ethical individualism (which mirrors Ayn Rand’s rational self-interest) and it emphasis on thinking as a “spiritual” tool – but as a text on epistemology, it is teeming with flaws. Steiner, a Ph.D in epistemology, has unique perspectives on the mind, which makes his book an interesting read - but in my opinion, most of his perspectives are wrong. Steiner makes you think about thinking – but if you really want to understand thinking, you need to read Ayn Rand’s “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology” (which I’ve reviewed at Amazon). I believe that most who compare Steiner’s book to Rand’s will consider the latter the (by far) superior text. But don’t take my word for it: read both and decide for yourself.
Steiner says that “thinking is beyond both subject and object.” No it isn’t. All thoughts, implicitly if not explicitly, involve a subject and an object. Mental abstraction always pertains to this duality. Even if dialectical thinking results in a higher-level synthesis, the subject-object nature of the thought process remains intact.
Steiner conflates cognition with thinking. They are not the same. Cognition pertains to “understanding” and “knowledge,” and not all thinking yields understanding and knowledge. Thinking is man’s chief cognitive method, but it does not always result in cognition, or “knowing.”
Steiner writes, “In this book I try to validate cognition of the spiritual realm before one enters spiritual experience.” Steiner never explains what the spiritual realm is, never validates cognition of it (whatever that means), and never explains what he means by spiritual experience or how it relates to Spirit. In short, he fails to link epistemology with spiritual ontology.
Steiner has little understanding of real mysticism. He writes:
“This tendency—the philosophy of feeling—is often called mysticism. A mystical view based solely on feeling errs in wanting to experience what it ought to know; it wants to make something that is individual, feeling, into something universal.
Feeling is a purely individual act. It is a relationship of the outer world to our subject, insofar as that relationship finds expression in a purely subjective experience.”
Contrary to what Steiner claims, higher mysticism is not based on subjective feelings. It is trans-psychological in nature and involves objective, impersonal beholding, or apprehension, of the Mysterium Tremendium: Divine Light-energy, the Holy Spirit. When one’s consciousness (or soul) unites with this Divine Light-energy, or Power, then one spontaneously experiences the transcendental feeling of Being, and this feeling is independent of emotions, though one may experience emotions in relation to it.
But Steiner is correct when he criticizes the use of one’s individual feelings as a means of cognition. He writes, “They try to make feeling, not knowing, the means of cognition. Since feeling is something altogether individual, something equivalent to perception, philosophers of feeling make something that has significance only within their own personality into the principle of the universe. They try to permeate the entire universe with their own selves.” Ayn Rand says the same thing, that emotions or feelings are not tools of cognition; they only tell you how you feel about something. But contrary to what Stein says, feeling is not equivalent to perception.
Steiner writes, “Feeling, like perceiving, always appears before cognizing.” Not true. First off, if one has already formed concepts about percepts, more concepts, or abstractions, can be formed from those concepts, hence cognizing can precede perceiving. Second, individual emotions, or feelings, follow cognition. For example, if you learn that your beloved dog was run over, you will feel intense emotional pain. In this case, feeling follows cognition.
A major weakness of this text is its failure to clearly explain what “intuition” is. Steiner defines it as “the conscious experience, within what is purely spiritual, of a spiritual context. But, again, Steiner does not define his terms and explain what he means by “spiritual” and “spiritual context.” Nor does he explain how intuition differs from feeling, which he denigrates as a means of cognition. Moreover, Steiner never broaches the subject of the subconscious mind, which integrates the material “fed” into by the conscious mind. In my opinion, much of so-called “intuition”stems from the subconscious.
Steiner says that “The essence of thinking can only be grasped through intuition.” Wrong. The essence of thinking can only be grasped via proper epistemology, which evades Steiner. I grasped the essence of thinking after, and not before, I read Rand; and if intuition enabled one to grasp this essence, why would one need to read any books on epistemology?
In summary, this text might impress those with little or no background in epistemology and ontology; but those with a deep and wide background.
[My 3-star Amazon review (August 27, 2013) of “Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path: A Philosophy of Fredom” by Rudolf Steiner.]
“Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path” is a mixed bag. It has positive aspects—its stress on ethical individualism (which mirrors Ayn Rand’s rational self-interest) and it emphasis on thinking as a “spiritual” tool – but as a text on epistemology, it is teeming with flaws. Steiner, a Ph.D in epistemology, has unique perspectives on the mind, which makes his book an interesting read - but in my opinion, most of his perspectives are wrong. Steiner makes you think about thinking – but if you really want to understand thinking, you need to read Ayn Rand’s “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology” (which I’ve reviewed at Amazon). I believe that most who compare Steiner’s book to Rand’s will consider the latter the (by far) superior text. But don’t take my word for it: read both and decide for yourself.
Steiner says that “thinking is beyond both subject and object.” No it isn’t. All thoughts, implicitly if not explicitly, involve a subject and an object. Mental abstraction always pertains to this duality. Even if dialectical thinking results in a higher-level synthesis, the subject-object nature of the thought process remains intact.
Steiner conflates cognition with thinking. They are not the same. Cognition pertains to “understanding” and “knowledge,” and not all thinking yields understanding and knowledge. Thinking is man’s chief cognitive method, but it does not always result in cognition, or “knowing.”
Steiner writes, “In this book I try to validate cognition of the spiritual realm before one enters spiritual experience.” Steiner never explains what the spiritual realm is, never validates cognition of it (whatever that means), and never explains what he means by spiritual experience or how it relates to Spirit. In short, he fails to link epistemology with spiritual ontology.
Steiner has little understanding of real mysticism. He writes:
“This tendency—the philosophy of feeling—is often called mysticism. A mystical view based solely on feeling errs in wanting to experience what it ought to know; it wants to make something that is individual, feeling, into something universal.
Feeling is a purely individual act. It is a relationship of the outer world to our subject, insofar as that relationship finds expression in a purely subjective experience.”
Contrary to what Steiner claims, higher mysticism is not based on subjective feelings. It is trans-psychological in nature and involves objective, impersonal beholding, or apprehension, of the Mysterium Tremendium: Divine Light-energy, the Holy Spirit. When one’s consciousness (or soul) unites with this Divine Light-energy, or Power, then one spontaneously experiences the transcendental feeling of Being, and this feeling is independent of emotions, though one may experience emotions in relation to it.
But Steiner is correct when he criticizes the use of one’s individual feelings as a means of cognition. He writes, “They try to make feeling, not knowing, the means of cognition. Since feeling is something altogether individual, something equivalent to perception, philosophers of feeling make something that has significance only within their own personality into the principle of the universe. They try to permeate the entire universe with their own selves.” Ayn Rand says the same thing, that emotions or feelings are not tools of cognition; they only tell you how you feel about something. But contrary to what Stein says, feeling is not equivalent to perception.
Steiner writes, “Feeling, like perceiving, always appears before cognizing.” Not true. First off, if one has already formed concepts about percepts, more concepts, or abstractions, can be formed from those concepts, hence cognizing can precede perceiving. Second, individual emotions, or feelings, follow cognition. For example, if you learn that your beloved dog was run over, you will feel intense emotional pain. In this case, feeling follows cognition.
A major weakness of this text is its failure to clearly explain what “intuition” is. Steiner defines it as “the conscious experience, within what is purely spiritual, of a spiritual context. But, again, Steiner does not define his terms and explain what he means by “spiritual” and “spiritual context.” Nor does he explain how intuition differs from feeling, which he denigrates as a means of cognition. Moreover, Steiner never broaches the subject of the subconscious mind, which integrates the material “fed” into by the conscious mind. In my opinion, much of so-called “intuition”stems from the subconscious.
Steiner says that “The essence of thinking can only be grasped through intuition.” Wrong. The essence of thinking can only be grasped via proper epistemology, which evades Steiner. I grasped the essence of thinking after, and not before, I read Rand; and if intuition enabled one to grasp this essence, why would one need to read any books on epistemology?
In summary, this text might impress those with little or no background in epistemology and ontology; but those with a deep and wide background.
